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1 Introduction
A recent literature uses a vector decomposition approach to explain why several standard voting procedures
produce different social choice outcomes on a given preference profile. A preference profile or profile for
short, is defined here as a distribution of a fixed set of voters (or judges) across all possible rank orders of
a set of candidates (or alternatives). With n-candidates and n! different ways of ranking them, a profile is
thus a n! dimensional vector with each element denoting either a number of voters or a proportion of an
electorate supporting a specific rank order of the candidates.1 The approach decomposes a given profile into
families of component profiles that lie in orthogonal subspaces. A family of component profiles lying in a
specific subspace produce a decisive outcome - one in which not all the candidates in a field are tied - under
some procedures but a complete tie under others. Thus, some standard procedures disagree on the social
choice outcomes on a given profile, if the latter happens to be a sum of component profiles of significant
weights but lying in different orthogonal subspaces.2
A component profile represents a hypothetical or virtual electorate (not an actual subset of voters) whose
weight measures the extent to which the distribution of voters in the real electorate or given profile is ex-
plained by the distribution of the virtual voters. Besides explaining disagreements across certain procedures,
the decomposition approach provides additional useful insight if the preference pattern of the virtual voters
in a component profile captures some feature(s) of the collective psyche of a real electorate, in some so-
cioeconomic context. In the past, the approach has inspired investigation into Condorcet cycles which are
known to be responsible for disagreement between the Borda count and various types of procedures based
on pairwise scores across candidate pairs (Zwicker (1991), Saari (1999, 2000 a,b)) and studies of how likely
such cycles are in reality (Gehrlein (2001)).
The present paper uses the profile decomposition approach to characterize a family of component pro-
files responsible for conflicts in the induced social rank orders under the plurality and the Borda count
methods. Both these procedures are widely used because of their many advantages and despite known
weaknesses. Plurality is adopted because of its ability to reward merit but also often criticized for its poten-
tial to elect a deeply unpopular candidate.3 The Borda count on the other hand is criticized for rewarding
mediocrity but is also known to be a method with the fewest known anomalies compared to other methods.4
1Since only numbers and not individual identities of voters are included in this description, the vector is sometimes described as
a voting situation as opposed to a profile. This distinction does not matter for us and hence the terms are here used interchangeably.
2The literature, often described as geometric voting theory, owes much of its development to the pioneering works of Saari and
several co-authors. The papers that are most relevant for us are Saari (1999, 2000 a,b). The basics of the theory are also discussed
in Hodge and Klima (2005), Balinski and Laraki (2010) and Nurmi (1996, 2002).
3Other useful properties of plurality that have been adduced, include, maximizing the number of voters who end up with their
most preferred choice (Bossert and Suzumura, 2017), efficiency (Yeh, 2008,) etc.
4The Borda count is shown to be the method most likely to respect the Condorcet principle (Newenhizen (1992)), the
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We build on an existing result which identifies a subspace of component profiles on which several stan-
dard sum-scoring procedures, plurality and the Borda count in particular, and some procedures based on
pairwise comparison of candidates, such as the Copeland, Black and Kemeny methods, lead to the same
outcome. Saari (1999, 2000a, 2000b) who is credited with this result describes these component profiles
as basic profiles. These above-mentioned methods induce the same social rank order of the candidates on
a given profile, if the latter happens to lie in the subspace spanned by basic profiles. When such is not the
case and some component profiles of the given profile lie in subspaces orthogonal to basic profiles, these
methods disagree. Furthermore, the rank order induced by the Borda count is always shown to follow the
weights of the basic profile components only, in any given profile.
Our first main result characterizes a family of component profiles which span a subspace orthogonal to
the span of the basic profiles and induced a rank order of the candidates under plurality which is decisive. In
other words, not all the candidates are tied under plurality on these profiles. Under the Borda count on the
other hand, these profiles produce a complete tie. Plurality and the Borda count are thus shown to disagree if
these component profiles are present in a given profile and have larger weights relative to those of the basic
profiles. The two methods concur if the weights of the basic profiles are relatively larger.
The above family of profiles is characterized by a most interesting preference structure. In each profile
in this family, a specific set of rank orders of the candidates and the reverse set of these rank orders are sup-
ported by the same number of voters. In particular, each such profile is characterized by a specific candidate
ranked first and last by an equal number of voters. In other words, the same candidate is ”loved” (ranked
first) and ”hated” (ranked last) by an equal number of the virtual voters. We describe these component
profiles as reverse profiles in light of this algebraic structure.5 Plurality induces a rank order in which a
specific candidate is strictly first ranked on each such profile (as it counts only the first choices). The Borda
count, which has the cancellation property (Young, (1974)), produces a complete tie across all candidates
on a reverse profile.
The (hypothetical) electorate of a reverse profile demonstrates an extreme like or dislike for a specific
candidate or alternative. In other words, it is polarized around a specific candidate or alternative. Many
recent studies provide evidence of such polarization around political candidates or on specific socioeco-
nomic issues, in the US and elsewhere in the world. These include Baldassarri and Geiman, (2008); Box-
ell, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2017); Mason (2015); Abramowitz and Saunders (2008); Fiorina and Abrams
unique method to satisfy a modified version of the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition (Maskin (2020)) and is non-
manipulable on a restricted domain (Barbie, Puppe and Tasnadi (2006). Other advantages are also discussed in Baharad and Nitzan
(2002), Dellis (2009).
5Condorcet cycles and other symmetric profiles of rank orders similar to reverse profiles are well known in Engineering disci-
plines where a different terminology is used for them. See Zwicker (1991) and other works by Saari which are not cited here.
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(2008); Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2008); Krasa and Polborn (2014), among others.
The paper contributes to the substantial and varied literature on measures of divisiveness within a so-
ciety, broadly defined as the presence of sizable groups who feel alienated from or hostile to each other.
Established measures of polarization define groups on the basis of a one-dimensional population character-
istic or attribute which may be a cardinal variable such as ”income” or an ordinal one such as a specific
”ethnicity”. Among other advantages, this uni-dimensionality allows some type of a distance function -
either Euclidean or discrete - to measure alienation across groups (Esteban and Ray (1994), Duclos, Esteban
and Ray (2004), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008))6.
The above criterion for defining groups fails if the population characteristic is not uni-dimensional or as
in our case, the difference between one population member and another is a difference in a preference rank
order. In political elections for high public offices for example, a voter usually assesses multiple candidates
along multiple criteria, such as policies on the economy, trade, immigration, environment etc. The output of
this assessment is usually a rank order of the candidates, either mental or sometimes explicitly stated on a
ballot. These rank orders are also the information available for defining group-membership or constructing
measures of inter-group alienation. With no generally accepted notion of a ”distance” between any two
such orders, the established measures cannot be applied. Our paper proposes measures constructed from the
weights of the reverse profiles as an alternative that is based on distribution of rank orders. Moreover, we
show that these measures also indicate the extent to which a polarized electorate contributes to the selection
of a winner of a race, when plurality or a plurality runoff is the procedure of choice.
When n = 3 and the profile space is 6-dimensional, two distinct basic profiles, two distinct reverse
profiles and one Condorcet profile are sufficient to obtain a complete decomposition of any profile (see
Section 3). When n≥ 4 however, the number of orthogonal basis vectors required to span the n! dimensional
profile space but not falling into either of these three classes, grows factorially. Not only is a complete profile
decomposition computationally intensive and perhaps even impossible for arbitrary n, but previous attempts
have shown that a majority of the component profiles outside of these three classes represent preference
patterns that are unlikely in reality.7
A second result of the paper, Theorem 2, demonstrates that a complete decomposition of a profile is
unnecessary in order to obtain the weights of the reverse profile components. It shows that the difference in
6See also Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2007) and Testa (2012) which use single peaked preferences on uni-dimensional
policy spaces to study effects of polarization on secession, public policy etc.
7Saari (2000b) constructs a complete orthogonal basis for the case n = 4, to explain all possible voting paradoxes under standard
procedures, including paradoxes that occur on subsets of candidates. The exercise involved constructing a set of 24 orthogonal basis
vectors. The paper concludes that such an exercise although possible for n = 5 and n = 6, is ”not useful”. By way of comparison,
the Democrat primaries of 2020 started with 10 official candidates.
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the plurality tallies of a candidate pair can be decomposed into two parts - a part contributed by the weights
of the basic profiles and another contributed by the weights of the reverse profiles only. By a previously
published result (Chandra and Roy (2013)), the weights of the basic profiles can be directly obtained from
the pairwise tallies across all candidate pairs, once effects due to Condorcet cycles are removed, using a
computationally simple recursive procedure. This being the case, by Theorem 2, the weights of the reverse
profiles can be directly obtained from the plurality tallies themselves.
The third and final Theorem 3 connects the differences in the weights of the basic and reverse profiles to
disagreement between the plurality and Borda count rank orders. This provides a way to construct measures
of polarization based on the relative weights of the basic and reverse profiles, some of which are discussed
in Section 5.2.
The following 3-candidate examples illustrate some of our main ideas and their underlying intuition,
with additional details provided in Section 3. The notation i  j stands for ”i is strictly preferred to j” and
i  j denotes ”i is weakly preferred to or at least as good as j”. The notation i ∼ j implies i and j are
preference equivalent.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider a profile consisting of 3 voters with preference A BC, another 3 voters with
preference C  B A and 1 voter with preference B AC. The social choice outcome or winners under
plurality are A and C and the induced social rank order of the candidates is A ∼ C  B. Under the Borda
count, the induced rank order is B AC and B is the unique winner. A runoff in which the candidate with
the lowest plurality tally is dropped, elects A who is the last choice of nearly 43% of the voters. The conflicts
between the plurality and the Borda Count outcomes and the induced rank orders are due to the presence of
two significant and nearly equal sized reverse profiles in the given one (see Section 3). Of the two reverse
profiles, the one with a slightly smaller weight has the hypothetical voters evenly split across rank orders
that place A in the first and last positions. The other reverse profile has hypothetical voters similarly split
across rank orders with C in the first and last places. There are two basic profile components of unequal
weights. The one with the larger weight favors B and accounts for the candidate’s first position in the Borda
rank order. The one with the smaller weight favors A and accounts for the candidate’s second position in the
Borda rank order and the win in the runoff.8
8Some evidence suggests that the scenario of Example 1 captures the last stage of the 2016 US Presidential Republican primaries
with only three candidates standing - Donald Trump, Ted Cruz and John Kasich. See, http://www.fairvote.org, for article posted on
Mar 04, 2016 by Andrew Douglas, Rob Richie, Elliott Louthen; http://www.newsweek.com for article posted on Oct 17, 2016 by
Paul Raeburn; http://thefederalist.com. for article posted on April 5, 2016 by Kyle Sammin.
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EXAMPLE 2: We next consider a different example in which preference polarization is visibly less stark
and noticeable compared to the first. Consider a profile of 8 voters with 5 of them ranking the candidates
A  B C and 3 of them ranking B C  A. The plurality winner is A and the induced rank order under
this method is A  B  C. Under the Borda count, candidate B is the winner and the induced rank order
is B  A  C. Once again, the disagreement between the two methods can be explained by two reverse
profile components with significant weights which are however difficult to envision without a formal profile
decomposition. One of the reverse profiles has voters equally split across rank orders which place A in the
first and last places. The other reverse profile has a negative weight, a novel feature of this example. The
next section explains what a negative weight generally means in the context of profile decomposition. In a
3-candidate field specifically, a reverse profile with a negative weight reflects a strong support for a specific
candidate in the second place but not in the first (and last) places. The candidate in question in this example
turns out to be B. The given profile also has two basic profile components. The one with the larger weight
favors B and the other favors A. The order of the basic profile weights explains the Borda outcome and rank
order.
On a practical level, profile decomposition requires information of every voter’s rank orders across all
candidates. Currently, there are few elections across the world that require voters to rank all candidates on
the ballot, although calls for such requirements are growing.9 Many city councils in the US and most impor-
tantly and recently, the State of Maine, have adopted the procedure of ranked choice voting which require
voters to rank candidates. Data availability nevertheless remains a critical limitation of this methodology.
The Cambridge City Council elections have a long history of using the ranked choice voting procedure.
The last section of the paper applies our decomposition method and polarization measures on ballot data
from these elections. This data has a major limitation in that, voters are required to rank at least one
candidate but not all. Thus the rank orders on the ballot are not complete. The exercise and the results are
nevertheless useful as a way of illustrating our technique and measures.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the definitions and the basic
framework used. Section 3 illustrates the profile decomposition technique with three candidates, a scenario
in which a complete profile decomposition is possible and easy. Sections 4 and 5 posits our main results.
Finally, Section 6 reports the results of the analysis of the Cambridge City Council elections data.
9See Gehrlein, Lepelley and Plassmann (2016) and http://www.fairvote.org
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2 Definitions and basic framework
We assume a field of n candidates or alternatives, indexed i = 1 . . .n, and a fixed electorate or set of vot-
ers/judges. Individual voters have strict, complete and transitive preferences over the alternatives. A prefer-
ence profile is a distribution of voters across the n! possible rank orders of the candidates and is denoted by
p = (p1 . . . pn!) ∈ Rn!+ , where pk denotes either the number of voters or the proportion of the electorate with
preferences given by the k-th rank order of the candidates.
A voting procedure or social choice function maps a profile p into a subset of the set of candidates,
which we describe as the social choice outcome or the set of winners. A voting procedure may induce a
weak rank order of the candidates which we describe as the social rank order.
A sum-scoring or positional voting procedure is a n-tuple, (w1, . . .wn) where wm ≥ 0 equals the total
points awarded by an individual voter to the candidate in the m-th position in his or her rank order. Only
positional procedures with the property wm ≥wm+1 and a strict inequality for some (m,m+1), are admitted.
The plurality voting procedure is represented by the n-tuple, (1,0 . . .0) and the Borda count by (n−1,n−
2 . . .0). A sum-scoring method induces a social rank order of the candidates based on the sum total of the
points awarded by all voters. The winner is (are) the first ranked alternative(s).
The pairwise tally difference for the (i, j) candidate pair, equals the number of voters who prefer i to
j minus the number of voters who prefer j to i. The normalized pairwise tally difference is defined as the
pairwise tally difference divided by the total number of voters. Denote by ai j, the normalized tally difference
for the (i, j) pair. Then
ai j =
# who prefer i to j - # who prefer j to i
# who prefer i to j + # who prefer j to i
=−a ji
and ai j > 0 implies, i beats j in a pairwise comparison across all voters. These scores by themselves are
not guaranteed to induce a transitive social rank order of the candidates when Condorcet cycles are present
in a profile. Methods based on pairwise comparisons of candidates are not the central object of our inquiry.
It is important to note however that Copeland, Black and Kemeny methods are based on the ai j scores across
all candidate pairs and the next section discusses profiles on which these methods concur with sum-scoring
methods.
The Borda score of candidate i has been shown to be an affine transformation of the sum of his/her ai j
scores across all rivals, namely, ∑ j 6=i ai j. Thus, the social rank order of the candidates induced by the Borda
count is the same as that induced by the set of such sums, {∑ j 6=i ai j}i=1...n (Saari (2000a, 2000b), Zwicker
(1991, 2016)). In particular, although the set of ai j scores is not guaranteed to induce a transitive social rank
order if Condorcet cycles are present, the set of sums, {∑ j 6=i ai j}i=1...n is. (see Section 2.2 for more).
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Let Kn be a n! dimensional vector with each component equal to 1. Assume an electorate of a given and
fixed size V , which is either the unit mass or a positive integer. A uniform distribution of voters within this
electorate is denoted by the profile Vn! K
n.
A Vn! K
n profile yields a tied outcome across all candidates under the admissible sum-scoring and some
pairwise procedures. Thus, under these procedures, the induced social rank order on any given profile is not
affected by adding or subtracting a scalar multiple of a Kn profile, although the candidate tallies change as a
result.
The above observation provides us with a convenient way to represent profiles and component profiles
in a decomposition. Express p as p = Vn! K
n + p′ where p′ ∈ Rn!. That is, p is obtained from a uniform
distribution of voters by moving some voters away from specific rank orders and adding them to others. The
negative components of p′ mark which rank orders suffer depletion and by how many voters, whereas the
positive components mark which ones experience gains and by how many. Stated alternatively, any given
profile p is a result of enhanced support for some rank orders and reduced support for others compared with
a uniform distribution of voters. Note that the components of the deviation profile p′ or the increments and
the decrements across all possible rank orders, must add up to zero. In other words, p′ itself can be regarded
as a deviation from a 0 ·Kn profile or electorate of size zero.
The deviation profile p′ and the given profile p induce the same social rank order of the candidates
(under admissible procedures), although candidate tallies on the two differ. In other words, the deviation
profile p′ ignores the neutral effects of the Kn component and captures the part of p which is decisive for
the social outcome. By way of convenience, the component profiles of interest in this paper are expressed
as deviations from a 0 ·Kn profile. To convert them into hypothetical electorates with non-negative voters,
one simply needs to add appropriate Kn components.
In any profile decomposition exercise, component profiles can have, in general, positive or negative
weights. A negative weight simply reverses the shifts across the rank orders in the component. Moreover,
under sum-scoring rules, the induced rank order on p′ and −p′ are also reversed. The following example
illustrates the concepts presented so far.
EXAMPLE 3: Consider a field of three candidates and an electorate of 30 voters with profile p =
(7,6,2,8,0,7). The six possible rank orders are indexed as in Table 2. The profile can be expressed as
p = 5K3 + p′, where p′ = (2,1,−3,3,−5,2). That is, p is obtained from the uniform distribution of voters
5K3 by moving voters away from rank orders (3) and (5) in which A is middle ranked and adding them to
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the rank orders in which A is either first or last ranked.
The plurality tallies of the candidates on p are (A : 13,B : 10,C : 7) whereas on p′, these are (A : 3,B :
0,C :−3). The induced social rank order under plurality on both p and p′ is A BC. The induced rank
order under Borda count on both profiles is B A∼C.
The profile −p′ is given by −p′ = (−2,−1,3,−3,5,−2) which indicates a shift of voters away from
rank orders (1), (2), (4) and (6), in which A is first or last ranked, to rank orders (3) and (5) in which A is
ranked in the middle. To convert −p′ into an electorate of the same size as p, we add a 5K3 component to
get −p′+ 5K3 = (3,4,8,2,10,3). The plurality rank order on the latter is C  B  A, whereas the Borda
rank order is A∼C  B.
2.1 Basic profiles
We owe the concept and understanding of basic profiles to the writings of Saari (1997, 2000a, 2000b). Only
the properties that are most relevant for our results are discussed here. The interested reader is referred to
these papers for additional insights and results.
To obtain a basic profile, fix a candidate, i. Take a 0 ·Kn profile and shift one voter from each rank
order which has i last ranked and add one voter to a rank order which has i first ranked. The component
profile thus obtained has one voter for each ranking that has i top ranked, (−1) voter for each ranking that
has i bottom ranked and 0 voter for each ranking that has i ranked somewhere in the middle. We denote this
profile by Bni . If a neutral K
n profile is added to Bni , the profile B
n
i +K
n has 2 voters for each rank order
which has i first ranked, 1 voter for each rank order which has i ranked somewhere in the middle and 0 voter
for each rank order which has i ranked last. Thus the virtual voters in a Bni profile demonstrate a ”strong to
moderate” liking for candidate i and nobody ”dislikes” him/her.





That is, only (n−1) of these profiles are linearly independent and without loss of generality, we assume that
these are the ones indexed, 1 . . .n−1.
Under admissible sum-scoring procedures and Copeland, Black and Kemeny methods, the profile aiBni
where ai > 0, has the i-th candidate top ranked and everyone else tied for the second place. In particular, the
induced rank orders under plurality and the Borda count agree on a aiBni profile. Moreover, a linear combi-
nation of basic profiles, p = ∑n−1i=1 aiB
n
i where the ai’s are given constants (positive or negative), induces the
same social rank order of the candidates under all these procedures.
Furthermore, it can be shown that the pairwise score for the candidate pair (i, j) on p, is given by
ai j = ai− a j, the difference in the coefficients of Bni and Bnj in p. Moreover, this is true for differences in
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the positional tallies of the candidates i and j as well. Thus, under the above procedures, the relative rank
of i and j in an induced social rank order on p is determined by the sign of ai− a j alone and not by the
coefficients or weights of the other basic profiles in p. If ai−a j > 0, i is ranked above j, if ai−a j < 0, i is
ranked below j and if ai−a j = 0, i and j are tied in the social rank order. The social rank order on a linear
combination of basic profiles is thus transitive and the same as the order of these weights.10
2.2 Condorcet profiles
To characterize a Condorcet profile, we first specify a reference rank order of the candidates, say 1  2 
3 . . . n, and index this rank order as (say), (1).
Consider two sets of cyclic rank orders generated by the reference rank order (1). We denote the first set
by cn(1) and the second set by ρ(c(1))
n. Each rank order in the set ρ(c(1))n is a reverse of the rank order in the




1 2 3 . . . n n n−1 n−2 . . . 1
2 3 4 . . . 1 n−1 n−2 n−3 . . . n
3 4 5 . . . 2 n−2 n−3 n−4 . . . n−2
. . . . . .
n 1 2 . . . n−1 1 n−1 n−2 . . . 2
A Condorcet profile Cn(1) associated with the reference rank order (1), is a profile that has one voter
for each rank order in the cn(1) set, (−1) voter for each rank order in the ρ(c
n
(1)) set and 0 voter for each
remaining rank order in the profile. The first or reference rank order of the set cn(1), uniquely characterizes
the Condorcet profile. There are (n−1)!2 distinct ways of constructing the reference rank order for a field of n
candidates. There are thus (n−1)!2 distinct Condorcet profiles in such a field. Table ( 7) lists the three distinct
Condorcet profiles for a 4-candidate field.
The Cn(1) profile is obtained from a 0 ·K
n profile by moving one voter away from each rank order in
ρ(cn(1)) and adding one voter to a rank order in c
n
(1). If a neutral K
n profile is added to Cn(1), the resulting
profile has 2 voters for each rank order in the cyclic set cn(1), 0 voter for each rank order in the reverse
cyclic set ρ(cn(1)), and 1 for all other rank orders. A Condorcet profile has the feature that each candidate
10The induced rank order is also consistent over subsets of candidates, in other words, robust with respect to candidates dropping
out of the race. This strong property has been described by Saari (1999, 2000a, 2000b) as the additive transitive property of basic
profiles.
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is supported in each position by an equal number of voters. Thus, it produces a complete tie across the
candidates under all sum-scoring procedures.
Condorcet profiles when significantly present in a given profile, can generate an intransitive social rank
order of the candidates under methods that use the pairwise score differences ai j across all candidate pairs.
A related and useful property of these scores is that although each ai j is affected by the presence and size of
the Condorcet cycles, the sum of the pairwise score differences for each candidate, ∑ j 6=i ai j, is not. In other
words, Condorcet effects cancel out when the pairwise score differences are aggregated for each candidate i
over all his/her rivals (See Zwicker (1991), Saari (2000a)). This explains why the Borda count is unaffected
by the presence of Condorcet cycles.
2.2.1 Basic profiles, Condorcet profiles and pairwise scores
The practical usefulness of the results of this paper, although not the results themselves, depends on there
being a computationally simple way to extract the weights of the basic profile components when n ≥ 4,
without resorting to complete profile decomposition. Two existing results involving the relationship between
the pairwise scores and the basic and the Condorcet profiles show that this is possible. The first of these is
due to Saari.
Saari (Proposition 5, 2000a): On any given profile, ai j = aTi j +a
C
i j where the component a
T
i j is determined
by the weights of basic profiles and the component aCi j is determined by the weights of all the distinct
Condorcet profiles.
The proposition thus says that only the weights of the basic and the Condorcet profiles contribute to
pairwise score differences. Other possible types of component profiles contribute nothing towards these
values. Moreover, as noted earlier, the component, aTi j is equal to ai−a j, the difference in the weights of Bni
and Bnj only, in any given profile.
A subsequent result by Chandra and Roy, (2013) shows that the set of these differences, {ai− a j}i 6= j,
can be obtained using a recursive procedure on the pairwise scores {ai j}i6= j themselves. Thus, the process
involves little computational complexity for arbitrary n when compared to what is involved in a complete
profile decomposition. The interested reader is referred to both papers for details of this procedure.
As noted earlier, the Borda score of candidate i is an affine function of ∑ j 6=i ai j. Combined with Saari’s
proposition above and the fact that the sum ∑ j 6=i ai j is free of Condorcet components, we have a useful
property of the Borda count. Namely, the induced social rank order on any given profile under the Borda
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count, follows the weights of its basic profile components only. In looking for component profiles to explain
the conflict between plurality and the Borda count, we must therefore look for component profiles that are
orthogonal to basic profiles and influence plurality tallies. The next subsection introduces and characterizes
such a class of profiles.
2.3 Reverse profiles
We begin by choosing an integer k such that 2≤ k ≤ n+12 . The choice k specifies a set of profiles which we
describe as class-k reverse profiles. The family of all reverse profiles is the set of all class-k reverse profiles
obtained by selecting all possible values of k satisfying 2 ≤ k ≤ n+12 . A class-k reverse profile favoring
candidate i, denoted Rni (k), is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (1) When n is even, such that, 2 ≤ k < n+12 , R
n
i (k), has 1 voter for each rank order in which
candidate i is first ranked and the reversal of this rank order which has i ranked last; (-1) voter for each
rank order in which candidate i is k-th ranked and the reversal of this rank order; 0 voters for all other rank
orders. (2) If k = n+12 (n is odd), R
n
i (k) has 1 voter for each rank order in which candidate i is first ranked
and the reversal of this rank order which has i last ranked; (-2) voters for each rank order in which the
candidate is k-th ranked; 0 voters for all other rank orders.
To understand the structure of Rni (k), assume n > 3 and k = 2. Then R
n
i (2) is obtained from a 0 ·Kn
profile by subtracting a voter from each rank order in which i is 2-nd or (n− 1)-th ranked and adding a
voter to a rank order in which i is first or last ranked. In other words, Rni (2) is obtained by boosting support
for rank orders in which i is placed at the two extremes and depleting support for rank orders in which i is
placed in the intermediate 2-nd and (n−1)-th positions. The value of k in Rni (k) thus specifies which rank
orders with i in an intermediate position are depleted, while the rank orders in which i is placed first or last
get a boost. If k = 3, support is taken away from rank orders in which i is in the 3-rd or (n−2)th place and
so on.
In a Rni (k) profile, each rank order that has i first and last ranked are supported by the same number of
voters. Thus, such a profile represents an electorate that is extremely polarized around the i-th candidate.11
There are n number of reverse profiles in each class. By construction, ∑ni=1 R
n
i (k)= 0 for each k, implying
there are (n−1) linearly independent reverse profiles in each class. The number of classes within the family
11The Rni (k) profiles defined here are similar but not identical in structure to Symmetric profiles defined in Saari (2000b), although
both types share some common properties. Saari’s construction appears to be driven by a specific need to express positional tallies
as deviations from the Borda Count (2000b, Proposition 1). Such a step in turn is necessary if the weights of the basic profiles are
unknown and the Borda Count is used as a surrogate.
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depends on the value of n. When n = 4, the only possible value of k is k = 2. The family of reverse profiles
contains a single class of three distinct reverse profiles. These are listed in Table ( 8) in the Appendix.
When n = 5, the family contains two classes of reverse profiles, one corresponding to k = 2 and the other
corresponding to k = 3. Each class has four distinct profiles.
When n = 3, the set of two distinct basic profiles, one Condorcet profile, two distinct reverse profiles
and a K3 profile span the 6-dimensional space of preference profiles. A complete decomposition of any
given profile is easy and straightforward. The next section illustrates the decomposition technology on a
few interesting 3-candidate profiles. These also serve to clarify the underlying intuition of some of our main
results.
The results of the paper assume a scenario which for lack of a better term, we describe as a full-field
scenario. It assumes that candidates do not drop out in the middle of a race. That is, the set of candidates on
which voters’ preferences are defined is identical to the set from which the eventual outcome(s) of the race
is determined. The extent to which these results generalize when candidates drop out in the middle of a race
is left for future research.
3 Profile decomposition with three candidates
Table 2 lists the six possible rank orders with three candidates (A, B and C), the basic profiles B3A and B
3
B,
the reverse profiles R3A and R
3
B, the Condorcet profile C
3, and the K3 profile.
Table 2:







3 K3 Profile p
(1) A BC 1 0 1 −2 1 1 1
(2) AC  B 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 0
(3) B AC 0 1 −2 1 −1 1 0
(4) BC  A −1 1 1 1 1 1 0
(5) C  A B 0 −1 −2 1 1 1 0
(6) C  B A −1 0 1 −2 −1 1 0
Consider a profile p consisting of a single voter (or a unit mass of voters) with preference order A 
B C. That is, p is a unanimity profile. The profile can be expressed as p = 16 K











3, that is as a deviation from the uniform distribution of voters, 16 K
3. The first notable feature of this
decomposition is that all three types of component profiles are present with non-zero weights. In particular,
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a unanimity profile cannot be obtained as a linear combination of basic profiles only and moreover, has a
reverse profile component.
The relative sizes and signs of the component weights provide insight into how p is obtained by decreas-
ing support for some specific rank orders and increasing support for others. The B3A component profile has
the greatest weight of all the component profiles and accounts for the shift away from rank orders (4) and
(6) which has A last ranked to rank orders (1) and (2) which has A top ranked. The negative R3B component
accounts for shift away from rank orders which has B first or last ranked to those which have B middle
ranked. The unanimity profile also has a Condorcet component which does not favor any specific candidate
for a specific position in the net (for example, a positive shift towards A BC which has A top ranked is
balanced by an equal negative shift towards AC  B).
Furthermore, note that the expression p = 16 K











3 can be alternatively writ-
ten as p = 16 K

















3 by substituting R3B = −(R3A + R3C). This provides a







(1/2,1/2,−1/3,−1/6,−1/3,−1/6) indicates a net shift of voters away from rank orders in which A is last
ranked or ranked in the middle and towards rank orders in which he/she is top ranked. The reverse profile
R3C favors C either in the first or the last position. But the weight of the reverse profile is not strong enough
to overcome the shift towards A for the first position.
3.1 Plurality and Borda count
A formal decomposition of the profiles of Examples 1 and 2 illustrate the role of reverse profiles in causing
disagreement between the plurality and the Borda count rank orders. Consider the unanimity profile p in
Table (3) with B  A C as the voters’ rank order of the candidates and the profile, q, which has 3 voters
supporting the rank order A BC and 3 others supporting the reverse rank order, C B A. The sum of
the two profiles, p+q, is the electorate described in Example 1.
Note that the two procedures agree on the social choice outcome of the unanimity profile p which has B
as the unique winner (not surprising, since all voters want it). But they do not agree on the induced social
rank order of the candidates. The social rank order is B  A ∼ C under plurality (as both A and C get 0
points) and B AC under the Borda rule.
The disagreement in the induced rank orders can be traced to the reverse profile component of p which
can be expressed as, p = 16 K













3. Consider the rest of the expression without the
−16 R
3












3 = (1/6,1/6,2/3,1/6,−1/3,1/6). Both plurality and the










C)) is responsible for the difference in the induced rank orders on p.
We next show that on profiles in which the weights of the reverse profiles are large enough relative to
those of basic profiles, the two methods differ on the social choice outcomes as well.
Table 3:
Rank order index Rank order Profile p Profile q Profile p+q Profile s
(1) A BC 0 3 3 5
(2) AC  B 0 0 0 0
(3) B AC 1 0 1 0
(4) BC  A 0 0 0 3
(5) C  A B 0 0 0 0
(6) C  B A 0 3 3 0
Note that the component profile q can be expressed as q = K3+R3A+R
3
C (or alternately as q = K
3−R3B).
In other words, q is a sum of two equally strong reverse profiles which support A and C in the first and
last places (or alternatively, a strong negative reverse profile which supports B in the second place). The

















with p, the profile p+ q has larger, positive R3A and R
3
C components which account for {A,C} being the
plurality winner and {B} being the Borda winner.
More generally, denote by Pl(.) the plurality outcome and by B(.) the Borda outcome on a profile. We
have, Pl(p) = B(p) = {B}. Note that B(mq) = {A,B,C} for any m > 0 by the Archimedean property and
B(p+mq) = {A,B,C}∩{B} = {B} by reinforcement. On the other hand, Pl(mq) = {A,C} for all m > 0,
whereas for m < 13 , Pl(p+mq) = {B}. For m =
1
3 , Pl(p+mq) = {A,B,C} and for m >
1
3 , Pl(p+mq) =
{A,C}. Thus, reverse profile components need to be of significant weights to generate a conflict between
the plurality and Borda outcomes. The results in section 5 establish the precise connection between rank
reversals of candidate pairs under plurality and Borda and the relative weights of basic and reverse profiles,
in a n-candidate field.
The profile in Example 2 is represented by s in Table 3 and has outcomes, Pl(s) = {A} and B(s) = {B}.


































3 by using the relationship −R3B = R3A +R3C. The profile has strong basic profile
components supporting A and B although one is less than the other. As the Borda count follows the weights
of the basic profiles only, B with a larger basic profile weight is Borda ranked higher than A. The plurality




6 vs 0 by the first
formulation, 36 vs −
2
6 by the second formulation). Specifically, the difference in the reverse profile weights
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are big enough to outweigh the difference in the basic profile weights.
Sections 4 and 5 present our main results.
4 Plurality tallies, basic and reverse profiles
Our first proposition describes some important properties of the Rni (k) profiles.
Proposition 1 For any given k,
1. The set of {Rni (k)}i=1...n profiles span a (n−1) dimensional subspace of the profile space and are not
pairwise orthogonal to each other.
2. The set of {Rni (k)}i=1...n profiles are pairwise orthogonal to the set of {Bni }i=1...n profiles.
3. The plurality tallies of candidates under Bni and R
n
i (k) profiles are identical, with candidate i receiving
(n−1)! points and every other candidate receiving −(n−2)! points each. In particular, these tallies
do not depend on the specific choice of k.
4. The pairwise score differences for each candidate pair, (i, j), on a reverse profile is zero which implies
that procedures based on pairwise tallies have all candidates tied. Thus the Borda count on a Rni (k)
profile have all candidates tied.
Proof: See Appendix.
Part 3 of the proposition is most important for our paper. While the nature of the hypothetical electorates
represented by Bni and R
n
i (k) are very dissimilar, both induce the same plurality rank order on the candidates.
Specifically, the plurality tallies of candidate i may mask the fact that the candidate in question is polarizing.
The proposition also says that the pairwise score differences, the ai j scores, are zero on reverse pro-
files, implying, in particular, that the Borda count has all candidates tied. This feature plays a key role in
subsequent results.
The first main result of the paper shows that Definition 1 characterizes all possible component profiles
that explain differences in the plurality and Borda count rank orders in a parsimonious way. No other type
of component profiles need be considered.
Theorem 1 The weights of basic and reverse profile components in any given profile are sufficient to explain
the plurality tallies and the induced rank order of the candidates. In particular, weights of reverse profile
components explain all conflict between the plurality and the Borda count rank orders.
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Proof: We try to characterize all possible component profiles that influence plurality tallies, are orthog-
onal to basic profiles and produce a zero pairwise score difference for each candidate pair so that the Borda
count obtains a tie across all candidates on them.
Let p be any given profile. Note that by construction of Bni , the dot product,
p ·Bni = (no. of voters in p who rank i first−no. of voters in p who rank i last)
Thus orthogonality implies that the total number of voters in the profile p who rank i first must equal the
total number of voters who rank i last.
For pairwise tallies to be zero for each candidate pair on p, a rank order and its reversal must be supported
by the same number of voters. The two statements together imply in particular, that rank orders that place
a specific candidate in the first position in p and their reversals which place the same candidate in the last
position must be supported by an equal number of voters.
The total number of voters in a component profile must add up to zero which implies that rank orders
and their reversals which are supported by positive number of voters must be balanced by rank orders and
their reversals supported by an equal but negative number of voters. In particular, this implies that positive
support for rank orders which have candidate i in the first and last places must be balanced by an equal and
negative support for rank orders and their reversals with i in an intermediate position.
Note that reverse profiles as described in Definition 1 satisfy all these required characteristics in a par-
simonious way. Hence their weights and the weights of the basic profiles are sufficient to explain plurality
tallies and all conflicts between plurality and the Borda count. ∆.
The theorem implies that the plurality tally of a candidate is the sum of two parts - a part contributed by
the weights of the basic profiles and the other by the weights of the reverse profiles, only. Thus, consider
a set of orthogonal basis vectors for the profile space and assume that the set includes all basic and reverse
profiles as defined earlier. The theorem says that the plurality tallies of the candidates on any given profile
are obtained on the part given by the combination of the basic and the reverse profiles only. Other basis
profiles need not be considered to explain these tallies. The result lays out a pathway for extracting the
weights of the reverse profiles without resorting to the computationally complex task of a complete profile
decomposition.
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5 Plurality tallies and weights of basic and reverse profiles
We establish the relationship between plurality tallies and weights of basic and reverse profiles (Theorem
2). The relative weights of these two types of profiles are used to explain rank reversals of candidate pairs
under the plurality and Borda rank orders (Theorem 3). We also discuss potential measures of polarization
based on the weights of the reverse profiles.
Denote by τ = {τi}ni=1, the vector of plurality tallies of the n candidates, on a given profile. Define by
τi j = τi− τ j, the difference in the plurality tallies of candidates i and j.
By Theorem 1, τ is obtained from a linear combination of Kn and the basic and reverse profile compo-
nents of the given profile. Assume V = 1. Then, τ is obtained on the part of the given profile which can
be expressed as ∑ni=1 aiB
n







n where the sets {ai} and {ri(k)} represent the
unknown coefficients of the basic and the reverse profiles.
As noted earlier, (n−1) of the basic profiles and (n−1) of the reverse profiles for each k are independent.




i (k) for each k. From
Proposition 1, the plurality tallies of Bni and R
n
i (k) are in identical direction, for each k. Together, these







































Equation (1) says the plurality tally of a candidate can be expressed as an affine function of the weights
of the basic and reverse profile components of a given profile. This leads us to our second main result and
an analogue to Saari 2000a, Proposition 5.
Theorem 2 The plurality tally difference between candidates i and m can be decomposed into two parts -
a part given by the difference in the weights of the basic profiles and a part given by the difference in the
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Proof: Follows directly from (1) on simplification.
5.1 Plurality vs Borda ranking
Our last main result shows that the relative sizes of the differences, {(ai−a j)} and {(∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k))},
are sufficient to explain all conflicts in the relative rank order of two candidates under plurality and Borda
count.
Theorem 3 Let p be any given profile.
a) All differences in the social rank order of candidates obtained under plurality and the Borda count
on p are attributed to the presence of reverse profile components.
b) Assume (ai−a j) 6= 0. The relative rank order of the (i, j) pair under plurality and Borda count are in
identical direction if the terms (ai−a j) and (∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k)) have the same sign or if |
(∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k))
ai−a j |<
1. The relative rank order is reversed if the terms are not of the same sign and | (∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k))ai−a j | > 1. If
(ai− a j) = 0 but (∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k)) 6= 0, the candidates are tied under the Borda method but not under
plurality. Their relative rank order under plurality is determined by the sign of (∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k)).
Proof: a) The Borda ranking of the candidates follow the differences ai−a j. Candidate i is Borda ranked
above (below) candidate j if ai−a j > 0 (ai−a j < 0). The candidates are tied if ai−a j = 0. The plurality
ranking follows the sum of the differences in the weights of the basic and reverse profiles as equation (2)
shows. Hence any disagreement between the two rank orders is solely due to the presence of reverse profiles.
b) The relative rank order of the (i, j) pair in the social rank order are in the same direction under plurality
and the Borda method if (ai−a j) and (τi−τ j) have the same sign. The rest of the statement follows directly
from equation (2). ∆.
Suppose without loss of generality that the n-th candidate is Borda last ranked, that is, (ai−an)≥ 0 for
all i. Then, if (∑k r j(k)−∑k rn(k))<−(a j−an) for some j, by Theorem 2 we have τ j−τn < 0 which implies
that the n-th candidate is not plurality last ranked. In other words, a significantly larger and positive reverse
profile component can boost the plurality tallies of the Borda last ranked candidate. Similarly, the Borda
first ranked (m-th) candidate may be plurality lower ranked than another candidate because of a significantly
smaller reverse profile component.
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The practical usefulness of Theorems 2 and 3 stems from the fact that the terms (ai−a j) and (∑k ri(k)−
∑k r j(k)) can be obtained without recourse to complete profile decomposition. Chandra and Roy (2013)
shows that the differences (ai−a j), can be obtained from the pairwise scores ai j, through a computationally
simple recursive procedure the details of which are skipped here and the interested reader is referred to the
paper. The differences (∑k ri(k)−∑k r j(k)) can then be obtained from the observed plurality tally differences
τi j and the obtained (ai−a j).
While it is possible to obtain the differences in the weights by using the Chandra-Roy algorithm, to
obtain an individual ai or the ∑k ri(k) for a specific i would require a normalization. We discuss one in
the next subsection where it is necessary. Moreover, equation (2) do not permit extraction of the weights
of all the individual reverse profiles. It allows us to solve for the sum ∑k ri(k) only for each i (subject
to the normalization). Note however, that so long as the objective is to simply assess the extent to which
preferences are extreme (like or dislike), it is not important to know the individual ri(k)-s.
5.2 Polarization measures
The weights {ai} and the sums of the weights, {∑k ri(k)}, are potentially useful for constructing a variety
of measures. First, we need to normalize one of the ai and one of the sums, ∑k ri(k), to zero. This can
be done in a way such that the remaining weights and the sums of weights are non-negative. Suppose
without loss of generality, that max(i, j)(ai−a j) = (am−an). As (am−an)≥ 0, the difference, (an−am) =
min(i, j)(ai−a j)≤ 0. Set an = 0 to obtain the values of all the remaining ai-s from the differences. Note that
an = 0 implies ai ≥ an = 0 for all i 6= n. Since the Borda rank order of the candidates follows the differences
ai−a j, this implies that the n-th candidate is Borda last ranked and the m-th candidate is Borda first ranked.
Similar steps may be used to normalize ∑k ri(k) to zero for some i, say i = l. Note that in general, l 6= n.
Denote ∑ni=1 ∑k ri(k) = r̄ and ∑
n





, when defined, are useful as
measures of how polarizing the specific candidate i is or how polarized the electorate is around the candidacy
of i. The ratio ∑k ri(k)r̄ provides a measure relative to other candidates in the field. On the other hand,
a higher value of ∑k ri(k)ai implies a greater influence of the reverse profiles relative to the basic profile in
determining the plurality tally of candidate i. A lower value of the ratio similarly implies a greater influence
of the basic profiles in determining these tallies. If ai = 0 and ∑k ri(k) > 0, the plurality tallies are entirely
contributed by reverse profiles. Thus, the ratio (when defined) measures candidate i ’s polarity relative to
his/her acceptability within the electorate with a lower value indicating a higher acceptability.
The ratio r̄ā measures how strong the reverse profiles are relative to the basic profiles on average in de-
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termining a social rank order of the candidates under plurality. A higher value of this ratio indicates that the
induced rank order is obtained on an electorate that is more sharply divided into groups that simultaneously
love or hate specific candidates. A lower value indicates that the induced rank order is more of a consensus
and closer to the rank order induced by the Borda count. The ratio can therefore also be used as a broad
measure of social divisions as reflected in the preferences for specific candidates or alternatives.
The last section of the paper applies some of these measures on ballot data from the Cambridge City
Council elections.
6 Results from the Cambridge City Council Elections
The nine members of the Cambridge City Council are elected using a single transferable vote system over
several counts of the ballots the first of which involves determining the plurality tallies of all the candidates.
A candidate is elected if he/she wins a certain proportion of the votes, called a quota.12 We test our decom-
position method and measures on the ballot data over the period 1997-2013. These elections are held every
two years providing us with nine years of data.
There are on average, 18 or19 official candidates, on the ballot. Voters also have the right to vote for
unofficial candidates of their choice by writing their names in a designated space on the ballot. The write-in
candidates appear mostly to be people well known within a very small group of voters (who rank them) but
unknown outside of this circle with one exception for the year 2009. In the year 2009, a popular candidate
who was successfully elected multiple times previously, failed to file the nomination papers on time and
hence was not included in the official list of candidates. The candidate participated as a write-in candidate
and actually ended up being elected. For our analysis for the year 2009, we treated this candidate as an
official rather than as a write-in candidate. With the exception of 2009, the few ballots where a write-in
candidate is ranked first in the other years are excluded from our analysis. The exclusion does not materially
affect the results reported here and moreover, considerably reduces the problem of dimensionality13.
The main limitation of the data set is that voters are not required to rank all candidates. Voters must rank
at least one of them for the first place and are free to rank as many of the others as they like. Most voters
12All candidates who reach the quota after the first count are declared elected. Surplus votes received by them are transferred
to the second choice candidates on the surplus ballots (A formula determines which ballots are selected as surplus ballots). After
surplus votes are transferred, candidates who have fewer than fifty votes are eliminated and their votes are transferred to the second
choice on these ballots. A new ranking is established of the continuing candidates, after this. The candidate with the lowest number
of tallies after the two transfers is declared defeated and his/her ballots are transferred to the next continuing candidate marked on
each ballot. Once a candidate reaches the quota, no more ballots are transferred to him/her. The process continues till all nine
members are elected.
13There are typically 7-9 write-in candidates in every election raising the total number of official and unofficial candidates to
25-28. If included, this causes n(n−2)! to be a large number and the left hand side of equation (2) to vanish.
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rank only about 4 or 5 candidates. Thus the major limitation of the data set is that the individual voters’ rank
orders are not complete as required by traditional social choice theory. The following assumptions are made
about the candidates who are not ranked by a voter. First, if a voter has not ranked a specific candidate,
say A, then it is assumed that the voter strictly prefers all the candidates that he or she has actually ranked
to candidate A. This enhances the pairwise tallies on candidates who are ranked relative to those who are
not. Secondly, if a voter has not ranked two candidates A and B say, we assume that he or she is indifferent
between A and B. The pairwise score difference for the (A,B) pair are thus effectively determined by the
number of voters who have ranked both these candidates. These assumptions affect our results which are
useful nevertheless, as a first attempt to apply the methods and measures discussed in the paper.
A second minor limitation of the data set is that, for some of the elections prior to 2005, we found several
ballots with multiple candidates ranked in the same position (”over-votes”). The problem of over-votes is
significantly less beginning with 2005, because of a new practice put in place by the Election Commission
that automatically ejects all such ballots and gives the voters another chance to redo their ballots. We
excluded all ballots with multiple candidates placed in the same position. Thus, for the years 1997-2003, on
an average about 8-9% of the total ballots were discarded. For the years 2005-2011, this percentage is about
1-2%. The discards account for some slight discrepancies between our plurality tallies for the candidates
and the official plurality tallies of the candidates after the first count for these years.
Table 4 presents the values obtained for the average measures, r̄ and r̄ā , discussed in Section 5. We
also include two other variants of these measures, r̄w and r̄wāw , which indicate these averages among the
winning candidates (that is, the 9 candidates who were finally elected to the Council). We identified pairs of
candidates whose relative ranks are reversed under plurality based on our estimates of the basic and reverse
profile coefficients. The number of such pairs as a proportion of the total number of distinct pairs is denoted
by Ψ in the table. Figure 1 plots the Table 4 values. Finally, Borda rank orders of the candidates were
constructed on the basis of the basic profile coefficients for all years. Table 5 reports selected final outcomes
in which a candidate who was Borda lower ranked by our estimates got elected but a candidate who was
Borda higher ranked, didn’t. Strong reverse profile components which boost plurality tallies in the first count
may partially explain these oddities.
The main findings from this exercise are summarized below. The reader is also referred to the working
paper version of this paper, (Roy, Wu and Chandra (2015)), for additional details that may be of limited
interest and hence not reported here.
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6.1 Summary results




higher for the period 2005-2013 than for the period 1999-2003. The ratio, r̄ā , r̄w, in particular shows steady
increase from 2007. Moreover, after 2005, extreme preferences seem to have played a generally bigger role
in determining the set of winners (compared to before 2005) as evidenced by the values of r̄w and the ratio
r̄w
āw
. These results seem to confirm for local elections, evidence of increased political polarization obtained
by other studies which are cited in the Introduction.
The measure Ψ does not show a trend over the years but is generally significant at an average of 36%
across all years. Among the Table 5 entries, the year 2009 is specially interesting. A candidate who was
Borda last ranked (21st) edged out Borda 4th and 9th ranked to get elected. This candidate was 1st ranked
according to the ∑k ri(k) coefficients and 5th ranked in the official first (plurality) count. Thus the candidate
seems to have been elected because of a strong reverse profile component. There were no such rank reversals
during the 2001 and 2003 elections. All the first nine Borda ranked candidates got elected to the Council.
Interestingly enough, the measures r̄ā , r̄w and
r̄w
āw
were also noticeably lower during these two years than
during the others. Furthermore, in 2013, four major rank reversals are estimated - higher than the number
for any other year. Also noticeably, the values of r̄, r̄ā and r̄w are significantly higher for this year than for
the other years.
Table 4: SUMMARY RESULTS FOR THE PERIOD 1997-2013




1997 0.203 0.153 0.94 0.070 0.20 0.40
1999 0.173 0.110 0.88 0.071 0.24 0.61
2001 0.193 0.146 0.77 0.061 0.16 0.23
2003 0.153 0.125 0.78 0.029 0.09 0.34
2005 0.224 0.171 0.85 0.089 0.22 0.34
2007 0.215 0.145 0.89 0.111 0.32 0.38
2009 0.240 0.146 0.92 0.150 0.43 0.32
2011 0.240 0.151 1.06 0.126 0.38 0.26
2013 0.253 0.118 1.38 0.172 0.26 0.24
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Table 5: SPECIFIC ELECTION ODDITIES
Years Description
1997 Borda and ai ranked 9th was edged out by Borda and ai ranked 11th
1999 Borda and ai ranked 2nd and 9th were edged out by Borda and ai ranked 10th and 11th
2001 None
2003 None
2005 Borda and ai ranked 7th was edged out by Borda and ai ranked 11th
2007 Borda and ai ranked 9th was edged out by Borda and ai ranked 10th
2009 Borda and ai ranked 4th and 9th were edged out by Borda and ai ranked 10th and 21st
2011 Borda and ai ranked 4th and 8th were edged out by Borda and ai ranked 10th and 11th
2013 Borda and ai ranked 2nd, 4th 8th and 9th were edged out by Borda and ai ranked 11th
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Figure 1: Summary results for the period 1997-2013






















7.1 Basic, reverse and Condorcet profiles with 4 candidates
The Tables ( 6), ( 7) and ( 8) list the three basic profiles, the three distinct Condorcet profiles and the three
reverse profiles for a 4-candidate field.
Table 6:











1. A > B >C > D 1 0 0 7. D >C > B > A -1 0 0
2. A > B > D >C 1 0 -1 8. C > D > B > A -1 0 1
3. A >C > B > D 1 0 0 9. D > B >C > A -1 0 0
4. A >C > D > B 1 -1 0 10. B > D >C > A -1 1 0
5. A > D >C > B 1 -1 0 11. B >C > D > A -1 1 0
6. A > D > B >C 1 0 -1 12. C > B > D > A -1 0 1
13. B > A >C > D 0 1 0 19. D >C > A > B 0 -1 0
14. B > A > D >C 0 1 -1 20. C > D > A > B 0 -1 1
15. C > A > B > D 0 0 1 21. D > B > A >C 0 0 -1
16. C > A > D > B 0 -1 1 22. B > D > A >C 0 1 -1
17. D > A > B >C 0 0 -1 23. C > B > A > D 0 0 1
18. D > A >C > B 0 -1 0 24. B >C > A > D 0 1 0
Table 7:











1. A > B >C > D 1 0 0 7. D >C > B > A -1 0 0
2. A > B > D >C 0 1 0 8. C > D > B > A 0 -1 0
3. A >C > B > D 0 0 1 9. D > B >C > A 0 0 -1
4. A >C > D > B 0 -1 0 10. B > D >C > A 0 1 0
5. A > D >C > B -1 0 0 11. B >C > D > A 1 0 0
6. A > D > B >C 0 0 -1 12. C > B > D > A 0 0 1
13. B > A >C > D 0 -1 0 19. D >C > A > B 0 1 0
14. B > A > D >C -1 0 0 20. C > D > A > B 1 0 0
15. C > A > B > D 0 1 0 21. D > B > A >C 0 -1 0
16. C > A > D > B 0 0 -1 22. B > D > A >C 0 0 1
17. D > A > B >C 1 0 0 23. C > B > A > D -1 0 0
18. D > A >C > B 0 0 1 24. B >C > A > D 0 0 -1
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Table 8:











1. A > B >C > D 1 -1 -1 7. D >C > B > A 1 -1 -1
2. A > B > D >C 1 -1 1 8. C > D > B > A 1 -1 1
3. A >C > B > D 1 -1 -1 9. D > B >C > A 1 -1 -1
4. A >C > D > B 1 1 -1 10. B > D >C > A 1 1 -1
5. A > D >C > B 1 1 -1 11. B >C > D > A 1 1 -1
6. A > D > B >C 1 -1 1 12. C > B > D > A 1 -1 1
13. B > A >C > D -1 1 -1 19. D >C > A > B -1 1 -1
14. B > A > D >C -1 1 1 20. C > D > A > B -1 1 1
15. C > A > B > D -1 -1 1 21. D > B > A >C -1 -1 1
16. C > A > D > B -1 1 1 22. B > D > A >C -1 1 1
17. D > A > B >C -1 -1 1 23. C > B > A > D -1 -1 1
18. D > A >C > B -1 1 -1 24. B >C > A > D -1 1 -1
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1





zero voters for A in the 1-st, 2-nd, (n−1)-th and n-th places. Rn2 has non-zero voters for B in the 1-st, 2-nd,
(n−1)-th and n-th places. The inner product of (Rn1)T and Rn2 have non-zero components for all rankings in
which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the 2-nd, (n−1)-th or n-th place (2) A is in the 2-nd place and B
is in the 1-st, (n−1)-th or n-th place (3) A is in the (n−1)-th place and B is in the 1-st, 2-nd or n-th place
and (4) A is in the n-th place and B is in the 1-st, 2-nd or (n−1)-th place. In each of these cases (a total of
twelve cases), A and B can be placed in their positions in (n− 2)! ways. These relevant components of Rn1
and Rn2 take values from the set {1,−1}. The non-zero components of the inner product sum to
−(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!
−(n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!− (n−2)! =−4(n−2)!
Hence Rn1 and R
n
2 are not orthogonal. By way of illustration, for n = 3 and n = 4, (R
3
1)
T R32 = −6 and
(R41)
T R42 =−8. The argument extends to all pairs of Rni profiles for k = 2.
Next note that all the previous steps of the proof for the pair (Rn1,R
n
2) apply to any 2 < k <
n+1
2 with
the following changes: Rn1(k) has non-zero voters for A in the 1-st, k-th, (n− k+ 1)-th and n-th places. Rn2
has non-zero voters for B in the 1-st, k-th, (n− k+ 1)-th and n-th places. The inner product of (Rn1(k))T
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and Rn2(k) have non-zero components for all rankings in which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the k-th,
(n− k+ 1)-th or n-th place (2) A is in the k-th place and B is in the 1-st, (n− k+ 1)-th or n-th place (3) A
is in the (n− k+1)-th place and B is in the 1-st, k-th or n-th place and (4) A is in the n-th place and B is in
the 1-st, k-th or (n− k+1)-th place. The sum of the non-zero components in the inner product is the same
as before as the rank order tallies have not changed. Once again the argument extends to all pairs of Rni (k)
profiles for 2 < k < n+12 .
Now suppose we choose k = n+12 which can only happen if n is odd. In a R
n
i (k) profile, candidate, i, is in
the k-th place in (n−1)! rankings and that half of these rankings are reversals of the other half. Each such
ranking has (-2) voters by construction. The inner product of (Rn1)
T and Rn2 have non-zero components for
all rankings in which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the n+12 -th or n-th place (2) A is in the
n+1
2 -th place
and B is in the 1-st, or n-th place (3) A is in the n-th place and B is in the 1-st, n+12 -th place. The non-zero
components of the inner product equal
−2(n−2)!+(n−2)!−2(n−2)!−2(n−2)!+(n−2)!−2(n−2)! = −6(n−2)!
which is not 0. Hence the non-orthogonality claim is true for any k and for all pairs of generic Reverse
profiles.
Consider the sum ∑ni=1 R
n
i for k = 2. For each rank order, only four out of these n profiles at a time
contribute non-zero voters. Two of the profiles contribute (+1) voter each for the candidates in the first and
last places. The other two profiles contribute (−1) each for candidates in the the 2-nd and (n−1)-th places.
Hence the sum is 0. For example, with five candidates and for the rank order A > B > C > D > E, the
profiles R5A and R
5
E contributes (+1) voter each to the sum of the five reverse profiles. The profiles R
5
B and
R5D contribute (−1) voter each to the same rank order.
Consider the sum of any (n−1) profiles out of the n profiles. There are many rank orders to which only
three out of (n− 1) reverse profiles contribute non-zero voters. As each profile contributes either (+1) or
(−1), the sum is not 0. Next consider any linear combination of the (n− 1) profiles and consider the first
rank order. Assume without loss of generality that the profile Rni with coefficient a contributes (+1) voter to
this combination and profiles Rnj and R
n
s with weights b and c respectively contribute (−1) voter each. Then
the first component of the linear combination is a−b− c which is zero if a = b+ c. Consider a rank order
in which candidate j occupies the first place and the other two candidates occupy the 2-nd and (n− 1)-th
places. The component corresponding to this rank order is zero if b = a+ c. Similarly, the component
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corresponding to another such rank order in which candidate s is first ranked and the other two are in 2-nd
and (n−1)-th places, is zero if c = a+b. It is straightforward to check that all three equalities are satisfied
only if a = b = c = 0. Hence any (n−1) reverse profiles are linearly independent and the set spans a (n−1)
dimensional subspace.
The arguments extend to any 2 < k < n+12 . When k =
n+1
2 , three out of these profiles contribute non-zero
voters for each rank order at a time. Two of the profiles contribute (+1) voter each for candidates in the
first and last places. One profile contributes (-2) for candidate in the k-th place. Hence the sum is 0. It
is straightforward to extend the remaining arguments to show linear independence of any subset of (n−1)
profiles.
Part 2: Consider the inner product of (Rni )T and Bni , for any given k. It has non-zero terms for all rank
orders in which candidate i is in the first or last place. In the first case, both profiles contribute (+1) voter to
the product. In the second case, the reverse profile contributes +1 voter whereas the basic profile contributes
(−1) voter to the product. The other terms in the product are all zero, given the structure of the two profiles.
As there are (n− 1)! rankings in which candidate i is first ranked and another (n− 1)! rankings in which
he/she is last ranked, the non-zero terms of the inner product equal (n−1)!.(1).(1)− (n−1)!.(1).(−1) = 0.
Hence this pair is orthogonal to each other.
Next assume that k = 2 and consider the inner product of (Rni )
T and Bnj , where i 6= j. This has non-zero
terms for all rankings in which (1) candidate j is in the 1-st place and i is in the 2-nd place (2) candidate
j is in the 1-st place and i is in the (n− 1)-th place (3) candidate j is in the n-th place and i is in the 2-nd
place and (4) candidate j is in the n-th place and i is in the (n−1)-th place. The non-zero terms add up to
−(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!+(n−2)! = 0. Hence these two vectors are orthogonal and the claim is true.
Again, the arguments extend directly without any changes for any k < n+12 . When k =
n+1
2 , the inner
product has non-zero terms for all rankings in which (1) candidate j is in the 1-st place and i is in the
n+1
2 -th place (2) candidate j is in the n-th place and i is in the
n+1
2 -th place. The non-zero terms add up to
−2(n−2)!+2(n−2)! = 0. Hence claim is true for any given k.
Part 3: Under a Bni profile, candidate i is ranked first (n−1)! times and hence receives as many points.
Candidate j receives non-zero votes only for rankings in which he/she is ranked first and candidate i is
ranked last. There are (n− 2)! such rankings each with (−1) voter. Thus every other candidate receives
−(n− 2)! points. Under a Rni profile, with k = 2, candidate i is ranked first (n− 1)! times and receives as
many points. Candidate j receives non-zero votes for every ranking in which (1) j is first ranked and i is
second ranked (2) j is first ranked and i is (n−1)-th ranked (3) j is first ranked and i is n-th ranked. There
are (n−2)! rank orders in each case. Candidate j receives (−1) for each ranking in the first two cases and
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(+1) for each ranking in the last case. Hence j receives −(n−2)! points.
These tallies remain unchanged for any choice of 2 < k < n+12 . For k =
n+1
2 , candidate j receives non-
zero votes for every ranking in which (1) j is first ranked and i is n+12 -th ranked (2) j is first ranked and i
is n-th ranked. There are (n−2)! rankings in each case. Candidate j receives (−2) for each ranking in the
first case and (+1) for each ranking in the last case. Hence j receives −(n−2)! points.
Part 4: Under a Rni profile, each rank order and its reversal has the same number of voters. Thus the
number of voters who rank a candidate i over candidate j is equal to the number of voters who rank j over
i. Consider the profile Rni +K
n. The social rank order on Rni and R
n
i +K
n are identical under Condorcet
extensions and the Borda count. The total number of voters in a Rni +K
n profile is 2(n−1)!+2(n−1)!+
(n− 4)(n− 1)! = n! for n > 3. Hence, ai j = 0 for each (i, j) pair. Thus all candidates are tied under the
Borda count and Condorcet extensions.
References
ABRAMOWITZ, A. I., AND K. L. SAUNDERS (2008): “Is Polarization a Myth?,” The Journal of Politics,
70(2).
BAHARAD, E., AND S. NITZAN (2002): “Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Pref-
erence Intensity,” American Political Science Review, 96.
BALDASSARRI, D., AND A. GELMAN (2008): “Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and
Trends in American Public Opinion,” American Journal of Sociology, 114.
BALINSKI, M., AND R. LARAKI (2010): Majority Judgement. The MIT Press.
BARBIE, M., C. PUPPE, AND A. TASNADI (2006): “Non-manipulable Domains for the Borda Count,”
Economic Theory, 27.
BOSSERT, W., AND K. SUZUMURA (2017): “The Greatest Unhappiness of the Least Number,” Social
Choice and Welfare, 49, 637–655.
BOXELL, L., M. GENTZKOW, AND J. M. SHAPIRO (2017): “Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization?
Evidence from Demographics,” NBER Working Paper Series, (23258).
CHANDRA, A., AND S. ROY (2013): “On Removing Condorcet Effects from Pairwise Elections Data,”
Social Choice and Welfare, 40(4).
29
DELLIS, A. (2009): “Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 144.
DUCLOS, J., J. ESTEBAN, AND D. RAY (2004): “Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation,”
Econometrica, 72, 1737–1772.
ESTEBAN, J., AND D. RAY (1994): “On the Measurement of Polarization,” Econometrica, 62, 819–851.
FIORINA, M., AND S. J. ABRAMS (2008): “Political Polarization in the American Public,” The Annual
Review of Political Science, 11.
FIORINA, M., S. J. ABRAMS, AND J. C. POPE (2008): “Polarization in the American Public: Misconcep-
tions and Misreadings,” The Journal of Politics, 70(2).
GEHRLEIN, W. V. (2001): Condorcet’s Paradox. Springer.
GEHRLEIN, W. V., D. LEPELLEY, AND F. PLASSMAN (2016): “Should voters be required to rank candi-
dates in an election?,” Social Choice and Welfare, 46.
HAIMANKO, O., M. LEBRETON, AND S. WEBER (2007): “The Stability Threshold and Two Facets of
Polarization,” Economic Theory, 30, 415–430.
HODGE, J. K., AND R. E. KLIMA (2005): The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Ap-
proach. American Mathematical Society.
KRASA, S., AND M. POLBORN (2014): “Policy Divergence and Voter Polarization in a Structural Model of
Elections,” Journal of Law and Economics, 57, 31–76.
MASKIN, E. (2020): “Arrow’s Theorem, May’s Axioms and the Borda Count,” Harvard University Working
Paper.
MASON, L. (2015): “”I Disrespectfully Agree” : The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and
Issue Polarization,” American Journal of Political Science, 59(1).
MONTALVO, J. G., AND M. REYNAL-QUEROL (2008): “Discrete Polarization with an Application to the
Determinants of Genocides,” Economic Journal, 118, 1835–65.
NEWENHIZEN, J. V. (1992): “The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle,” Eco-
nomic Theory, 2, 69–83.
30
NURMI, H. (1996): Voting Paradoxes and How To Deal With Them. Springer.
(2002): Voting Procedures Under Uncertainty. Springer.
ROY, S., K. C. WU, AND A. CHANDRA (2015): “Uncovering the ”Will of the People”: Measuring Prefer-
ence Polarization among Voters,” Dept. of Economics Working paper 15001.
SAARI, D. G. (1999): “Explaining All Three Voting Outcomes,” Journal of Economic Theory, 87, 313–355.
(2000a): “Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes I. Pairwise Votes,” Economic Theory, 15,
1–53.
(2000b): “Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes II. Positional Methods,” Economic Theory,
15, 55–102.
TESTA, C. (2012): “Is Polarization Bad?,” European Economic Review, 56, 1104–1118.
YEH, C.-H. (2008): “An Efficiency Characterization of Plurality Rule in Collective Choice Problems,”
Economic Theory, 34.
YOUNG, H. P. (1974): “A Note on Preference Aggregation,” Econometrica, 42, 1129–1131.
(1975): “Social Choice Scoring Functions,” SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 28, 824–838.
(1988): “Condorcet’s Theory of Voting,” American Political Science Review, 82, 1231–1244.
YOUNG, H. P., AND A. LEVENGLICK (1978): “A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle,”
SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 35, 285–300.
ZWICKER, W. S. (1991): “The Voter’s Paradox, Spin and the Borda count,” Mathematical Social Sciences,
22.
(2016): in Handbook of Computational Social Choice, ed. by F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss,
J. Lang, and A. D. Procacciachap. 2.
31
